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FOREIGNERS AT THE GATE: SWEEPING
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES ON THE CENTRAL
KINGDOM'S LANDSCAPE-FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT REGULATIONS & DISPUTE RESOLUTION

MECHANISMS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
George 0. White III*

"The elevation of law over politics is very new in China
and the extent to which it is to be taken seriously is not
always clear to the Chinese involved. The Chinese
official and the Chinese citizen are part of a political
structure in which the Party's will and policies have been
the most effective law .... Laws and regulations have to
be understood in this wider context of a society in which
the formal legal position is only one consideration and
still often not the most important."' "China is the most
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active market in the world. It's like a big magnetic field
and will 2draw in more and more international
investment.
I. INTRODUCTION

A new economic world order took effect with the advent of the
People's Republic of China (China or P.R.C.) 3 being admitted into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) 4 on November 10, 2001 .5 For a
country with a population of over 1,300,000,000,6 this proved a
2 Investment

in China Increased Most, AsIAINFo DAILY CHINA NEWS, Sept. 14,

2001, at 1 (quoting the president of Ericsson Co., Ltd.). The President went on to
say "China is likely to become the most important market of Ericsson in the world."
Id.
3 See Overview of Modern-Day China at
http://www.freep.com/news/nw/deng/deng5.htm (last visited March 21, 2002)
(indicating that as of 1995 China's population stood at 1.2 billion people---one-fifth
of the world's population---and its landmass is slightly larger than that of the U.S.).
4 See, e.g., Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of
Seattle, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257, 267 (2000).
The WTO was proposed in 1990 by the Minister of Trade of Canada
and was finally established in April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh,
Morocco as a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations .... the WTO was [thus] born on January 1, 1995. For
fifty years and until 1995, international trade functioned without a
firmly established organization, under the aegis of the GATT, where
rules of the game developed and were generally respected despite
the fact that the GATT did not have the same international and
political standing as the IMF or the World Bank .... [Now,][t]he
WTO is the principle international agency overseeing and
administering the rules of international trade ....
Membership of
the WTO has mushroomed to one hundred thirty-six countries [now
137 countries with the People's Republic of China as a contracting
member] (one hundred developing nations and about thirty
developed nations) with [twenty-nine] nations... waiting to join...
Id.
5 See generally China'sgreat step forward,FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 2001, at 128. China
also won the rights to host the Summer Olympic Games in 2008, for which it is
expected to spend US $22 billion on domestic investment--four times that of the
Sydney games. See Martin Walsh, Olympics opportunity, but be cautious, ASIA
TODAY INT'L, Oct./Nov. 2002, at 17.
6 See Econ. Intelligence Unit, Country Homepages: China at
http ://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=-countryhome_page&countryid=cn
(last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
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momentous occasion, and would forever change the investment
climate in Asia. China's international stature is very difficult to label.
It could be called a developing country, because severe poverty,
illiteracy, labor, population, and environmental concerns, which are all
elements associated with developing countries, exist throughout the
country.7 Yet, China is a land of vast opportunity. With the suggested
third largest economy in the world, its domestic markets are expansive
and potential purchasing power is measureless. Most economists
predicted China to be the most powerful economy by the middle of the
21 " century. 9 At one time China was " ... an island among nations,
isolated and greatly misunderstood. . .",10;
but now, as the greatest
investment destination in the world, it is appreciated by virtually every
major multinational enterprise. 11 Even prior to being accepted into the
WTO and winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympic
Games, 12 other than the United States, China had attracted more
foreign direct investment (FDI), 13 than any other country in the

7 See Ralph H. Folsom &

W. Davis Folsom, An Introduction To International

Business Agreements In The PRC, in

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds.

1996).

8 See John S. Mo, International Foreign Investment Law, in INTRODUCTION To
CHINESE LAW 275 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds. 1997) (stating that in

1996 China had a foreign currency reserve totaling U.S.S800 billion).
9See id.; see also Daniel J. Brink & Xiao Lin Li, China on the Horizon: Exploring
Current Legal Issues: A Legal and PracticalOverview of Direct Investment and
Joint Ventures in the "New" China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 570-71 (1995)
(stating that "China consists of 9.65 million square kilometers of territory and 1.2
billion people, including fifty-six minorities .... [thus] by using a 'step-by-step'
approach, the Chinese government has managed to open nearly all of China's
territories to foreign investment").
10 Gary J. Dernelle, Direct Foreign Investment and Contractual Relations in the
People'sRepublic of China, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 331, 331 (1994).
11See, e.g., Steve Stackhouse, Outward Bound?, AREA DEv., Nov. 2001, at 42
(explaining that "Companies are interested in locating in China because of the size of
the market and the fact that consumer wealth has nowhere to go but up. 'The only
major economy in the world still showing significant growth is China."'). "When it
comes to overall annual foreign direct investment ...China is still tracking near the
$40 billion mark, where it's been for about three years." Id.
12 See generally Stefano Hatfield, China's the New Gold Rush, But Nothing is as it
Appears, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 21, 2002, at 20.
13 See Adjunct Professor Robert Bejesky, Class Lecture in International Trade at
Thomas M. Cooley Law School (Jan. 14, 2000) (notes on file with the author)
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world. 14 It is estimated that China "will absorb $57.6 billion worth of
direct foreign investment in five years [time], which will control 6.5%
of the global economy."' 15 This estimate is an increase from the
intake
6
of FDI in 2001 equaling an astonishing record $46.8 billion.'
Foreign investors are eager to invest in projects and ventures (and are
confident as to their interest and profit potential) in China, but they
may not be so sure as to what laws apply or understand the legal
system. In fact, the FDI regulatory (legal) structure is, to many
17
investors, unclear, "uncertain, risky, and mired in red tape."'
"[T]here have been cases where foreign corporations have invested in
joint ventures following what they thought to be all the requisite
guidelines, only to find out after the money had exchanged hands that
something was terribly wrong with the entire agreement."' 18 Such
unfavorable occurrences have caused many to question the ability of
the Chinese government-including it's mammoth legal and
administrative branches--to reform a rather unfriendly FDI
environment plagued by inconsistent rulings, opaque19operations,
inefficiency, confusion, and a lack of predictability.
(explaining that foreign direct investment is when a non-national entity/legal person
invests in a foreign country).
14 See Wei Gu, China Enters The WTO, GLOBAL FINANCE, Nov. 1991,
at 59; see
also Hatfield,supra note, at 12 (estimating that FDI for 2001 reached a new high of
around $47 billion). Companies presently investing or building projects in China is

a who's who among fortune 500 companies, including Motorola, General Motors,
GE, Kodak, Coca Cola, Exxon Mobile, Dupont, United Technologies, Intel, IBM,

Pepsi, Ford, Hewlett Packard, and British Petroleum, to name a few. See
International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign
Investment
Laws:
Changes,
May
2001,
at
http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/ticwebsite/apweb.nsf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
15 Investment in China Increased Most, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS,
Sept. 14,
2001, at 1 (quoting the president of Ericsson Co., Ltd.). The President went on to
state "China is likely to become the most important market of Ericsson in the
world." Id.
16 James Kynge et al., China's Bank Chief Criticizes Low Value of Yen, FIN. TIMEs,
Jan. 16, 2002, at 10. "The promised FDI was $69.lbn-a figure that expresses the
enthusiasm permeating the foreign business community following China's entry into
the WTO last year." Id.
17 Leontine D. Chuang, Investing in China's Telecommunications Market:
Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China, 20 J. INT'L. L.
Bus.
509, 510 (2000).
18
Id.
1
9But see, Michael Santoro, Should LDCs Love MANCs?, 32 J. OF INT'L Bus. STUD. 3
(2001), at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issuejanfeb_2002.gns.html

(stating that
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However, unlike many other countries in the region, China has
boundless potential to grow. 20 If foreigners see the benefits
outweighing the costs and risks involved with investing and doing
business in China, as seen by most today,2 ' then they must be cautious
of the hurdles and pitfalls faced when dealing with a weak and
developing legal system. Chinese authorities are keenly aware of the
fact that potential foreign investors, throughout the world, are keeping
a close eye on when and by what means they create greater clarity in
the legal investment framework, by way of strengthening the rule of
law in China. 22 "Though the Chinese leadership has signaled... that
it is willing to make [much needed] changes in exchange for the ability
to reinvigorate its economy and secure its position as a world leader,
23
these changes will not come easily, nor will they come quickly.,
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
China is considered to be one of the oldest living civilizations
on earth.24 Up until the twentieth century, and for essentially five
"China welcomes foreign investment with open arms and a pro-business regulatory

environment."); Michael Santoro, Should LDCs Love MNCs ?, 32 J. OF LN-L Bus.
STuD. 3 (2001). China is the second largest market for every good and service
worldwide, but for foreign venture capital firms and other equity investors, its
morass of regulations make it a mystery. Although the country is the second largest
recipient of direct foreign investment in the world-about $40 billion
annually-private equity investment in China either has failed miserably or
produced spotty returns. Vincent Ryan, Golden Oppurtunities,Hidden Difficulties,
TELEPHONY, Dec. 3, 2001, at 45. See generally Peter Howard Come, Lateral
Movements: Legal Flexibility and Foreign Investment Regulation in China, 27 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 247, 247-48 (1995).
20 See Chuang, supra note 17, at 511.
21 See generally Jeffrey E. Garten, The Wrong Time for Companies to Beat a Global

Retreat, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 22 (stating that "AOL Time Wamer just
concluded [a] joint venture with China's largest computer company, the Legend
Group, and Wal-Mart Stores[] [announced] that it would build five new stores in
Beijing alone."). "Guangdong recently attracted one of the big wheels of American
retailing, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The giant chain will open discount stores and Sam's
Club membership warehouses in Shenzhen and Shanghai ... ." Henry J. Graham,
Foreign Investment Laws Of ChinaAnd The United States: A Comparative Study, 5
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 269 (1996).
22 See generally Chuang,supra note 17, at 511.
23Id.
24 See Ralph H. Folsom & John H.Minan, Chinese Legal Tradition, in LAW IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds. 1989).
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thousand years, China was ruled by a series of feudal lords and hermit
26
kings. 25 In fact, not until thirty years after Chairman Mao Zedong
and the Communist Party's declaration of the People's Republic of
China (on2 7October 1, 1949), would any form of economic openness
take root.

Before the ascendance of the People's Republic of China, the
Chinese central authority could not effectively control the influences
and methods for which foreign businesses operated in China "which..
. operated as 'states within a state." ' 28 Because of this historical
problem, the Communist party had a deep "distrust for capitalist
29
endeavors and, correspondingly, of western traders and investors.,
"In an effort to prevent any further exploitation, the Chinese
Government sought to eliminate the autonomy of foreign owned
enterprises, if not eradicate them., 30 For example:
[o]ne of the key impediments to the growth of the
Chinese economy during the Mao regime was the overemphasis on the concept of self-reliance. During this era,
regions were expected to operate in full autonomy
without outside assistance. This created a weakening of
See generally DUN J. LI, THE AGELESS CHINESE 31-54 (Charles Scribner's Sons 3rd.

ed. 1978) (1965).
See generally LI, supra note 24, at 31- 37.
Chairman Mao's name can also be spelled "Tse-Tung." See MAO TSE-TUNG: A

25

26

Biography, at http://www.marxists.org/glossary/people/m/a.htm#mao-tse-tung (last
visited Mar. 22, 2001) (indicating that Chairman Mao was born into a poor peasant
family on Dec. 26 1893, and died as the leader of Communist China on Dec. 9,
1976).
27 See Chuang, supra note 17, at 509. In the days of Mao Zedong, China defended
its economic security by burrowing factories deep in the mountainous regions,
stockpiling grain and stationing soldiers at bridges and dams. It has come a long way
since then, opening its economy to foreign goods, capital and management shifting
from a defensive, war-like economic footing to one based on closer ties to the
outside world.
Bruce Gilley, Building a Wall Or a Bridge?, FAR EASTERN ECON. REv., Feb. 2,
2002, at 30.
28 Demelle, supra note 10, at 331. One can look to the Treaty of Nanking in 1842,
concluding the Opium War, which was fought between the British and Chinese,
essentially "forced open" the Chinese doors to commercial trade and investment
with the West. See LI, supra note 24, at 340. As an example, the island of Hong
Kong was ceded to the British and became part of the British Empire by the Treaty
of Nanking. See id.
29 Demelle, supra note 10, at 331-32.
30
See CountryHomepages: China, supra note 6.
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economic and trade relations between regions and
generated inter-regional rivalries which resulted in
shortages of essential materials and products. 3 '
At its very essence, the communist government was anxiety-ridden
over the idea that anything other than a "closed door policy" would
bring a return to "difficult times" suffered prior to Communist control,
"when foreign economic domination, interference, and exploitation
32
were believed to have led to national humiliation and poverty.
However, Deng Xiaoping, 33 predecessor to Mao Zedong,
eschewed the Communist concerns and recognized the inescapable
"death of the communist world" 34 thereby establishing a liberal plan to
"suit [China's] unique characteristics and ensure its survival" 35 by
allowing a greater western commercial presence in China.36 Thus
. in 1979, the sleeping giant awoke when it voluntarily opened its
37
doors to foreign investment... by adopting an open door policy"
thereby intending to "implement China's 'Four Modernizations'
program. 38 This program was an attempt to "accelerate China's
socialist regime, 39 by way of attracting foreign investment in an effort
primarily
to modernize China's lagging domestic industries,
4
0
defense.
national
and
technology,
and
science
agriculture,
31 See Chang Hung Tai, Investment Factors, in CFINA'S INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: TRADE AND INVESTMENT §2, at 21 (K C D M Wilde ed. 2000).
32

Id. at 332. Again, see the example in note 27 demonstrating concerns faced by the
Chinese and Communist government. Also consider these concerns within the
Chinese concept of "saving face." See infra Part IV. 1A.
whole
33
See Biography:Deng Xiaoping,at
http://www.freep.com/news/nw/deng/deng3.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002)
(explaining that Deng Xiaoping was born in Sichuan province, China, in 1905, and
died from Parkinson's disease on Feb. 19, 1997, at the age of 93).
34 Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In A Transitional
5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 457,458 (1996).
Economy,
35
Id.
36 See Folsom supra note 24, at 13 (describing Deng Xiaoping's promulgation of
new laws and regulations as part of a post-Mao, post Cultural Revolution

renaissance era).

31 Id. This was done by way of the December 1978 meeting of the Third Plenary
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. See
Han, supra note 34, at 458.
38 Dernelle, supra note 10, at 332, & n.8. Dernelle went on to state that "Until 1978,
[FDI] in China was virtually prohibited." Id. at 331.
39

id.

40 See Tai, supra note 31, at 19.
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Furthermore, since 1979, the Chinese economy and legal
structure has been, shaky at best. 4 1 Nonetheless, while the road has
been "bumpy," Deng Xiaoping's "open door policy" has produced
results. For example, it is estimated that since 1979 China's economy
has grown, on average, anywhere from 7% to 13%,42 and FDI, last
43
year, rose by 15% over the previous year.
In fact, there were
"[22,915] new foreign capital investment enterprises in China in the
'4 4
first 11 months of 2001 .... increase[d] 16.32% [from] last year.
Over $348 billion 45 was invested in China by foreign enterprises from
1979 to 1997.46 It is estimated that "foreign funded" companies
employ up to as many as 18 million people, equaling roughly 10% of
China's non-farming population. 4 7 "Currently, more than 200 of the
world's top 500 firms have invested in China [and] a majority of these

are involved in the '4[much needed] machinery, electronics and
infrastructural sectors.'
III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT REGULATIONS: A LOOK
AT THE MOST POPULAR & EFFECTIVE INVESTMENT
VEHICLES CURRENTLY BEING USED
As previously mentioned, when the Chinese Government
instituted the "open door policy," there was virtually no legal structure
to act as a regulatory mechanism. 49 There was also virtually no
codified law or regulations pertaining to foreign commercial enterprise
ventures/investments. 50 Because of these endemic problems, the
41See Chuang, supra note 17, at 509.

42 Id. (stating that "[flrom 1978 to 1993, its economy grew between US $2,000 and
$4,000 per capita and in the early 90's its economic growth was unprecedented at
13% a year); see also Is it at risk? - Globalisation,362 THE ECON., Feb. 2, 2002, at
73 (stating that the Chinese economy grew at a rate of 7% throughout the 1990's and
by 12% in 2000).
43 See Economic Monitor: China, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Feb. 7, 2002, at 52.
4Investment Realm of China Develops Rapidly in 2001, ASLAINFo DALY CHINA
NEWS, Dec. 21, 2001, at 1.
45 U.S. dollars ($).

46
47 See KUI HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW § 3.1.1, at 84 & n.5 (2000).

See id at 84.
id.
41 See id. at 83.
48

50 See id. The terms foreign enterprise, venture, & investor are all synonymous
in

this article.
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Chinese government set-out to create a conducive investment
environment by way of enacting laws and regulations providing
foreign investors "certain rights and interests. 51 Since the passage of
the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures of 19795- which
is the fundamental piece of legislation dealing with foreign investment
in China-the Chinese government has passed over 200 laws and
regulations relating to, e.g., foreign joint ventures, offshore oil
exploration, foreign economic contracts, mediation and arbitration
proceedings, and Special Economic Zones. 53 For example:
[i]t has been claimed . . . that over the past 20 years
(1979-99): (1) the NPC [National People's Congress]
and its Standing Committee have examined and
adopted a total of 327 laws and decisions[;] (2) the
State Council has enacted more than 750 administrative
laws and regulations and[;] (3) the local People's
Congresses at various levels have formulated more than
53[,]000 local decrees. 54
It must also be mentioned that many countries have entered into
bilateral treaties with China for the purpose of protecting FDI projects
and ventures for their national enterprises."
Besides enacting new foreign investment laws to protect
foreign investors, the Chinese government also amended its
Constitution,56 which was adopted on December 1982. 57 This revision
stated "foreign enterprises, economic organisations and individual
entrepreneurs are permitted to invest in China and to take part in
various forms of economic co-operation
with Chinese enterprises and
58
organisations."
other economic
51Tai, supra note 31, at 24.
52 See MOFTEC at http://www.moftec.gov.cn (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
53 See id.
54 See WANG, supra note 46, § 3.1.1, at 83 & n. 1.
55 See id. at 83-84 & n.3 (stating that 41 bilateral treaties have been entered between
China and various other countries and 24 of the bilateral treaties are presently in
force). Some of the countries that have enacted such treaties are Germany, Great
Britain, France, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Turkey.

Id.
56 See Chuang, supra note 17, at 512.
57 See Tai, supra note 31, at 24.
5

8id.
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The Chinese government also took a revolutionary step by
establishing the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
(MOFTEC). 5 9 MOFTEC was formed for the purpose of administerin

China's foreign trade and economic cooperation arrangements. %

MOFTEC has a number of responsibilities, these include: (1) to
formulate laws, regulations, and policies; (2) co-ordinate foreign trade,

investment, and economic development; (3) form nationally strategic
plans; and (4) administering all foreign investment contracts, laws, and
regulations. 6 It is estimated that since China's opening-up, MOFTEC
has approved over 314,000 investment projects, "but less than half of
them have begun operating . . . [t]hese projects have a combined
contractual foreign investment of US$545.366 billion, of which
62
US$242.321 billion have already been invested.

Among all of the important activities and functions that
MOFTEC has executed, the most important was the Catalogue For
The Guidance Of Foreign Investment Industries. 63 This system is
vitally important because it serves as a guide for all foreign investors
"because it lists the industries in which foreign investment is
encouraged, restricted, or prohibited." 64
However, unless the
catalogue is quickly modified to meet WTO specifications, it will
become defunct
and eventually be replaced by WTO guidelines and
65
agreements.

The two most popular forms of FDI, which are encouraged by
the Chinese government, are equity joint ventures and wholly foreignowned enterprises (100% foreign owned enterprises).6 6 These are the

primary mechanisms (which comprise an overwhelming majority of
59

60

See Chuang, supra note 17, at 512. See generally MOFTEC, supra note 52.
See Chuang, supra note 17, at 512. This foreign ministry was originally named

the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). See Michael J.
Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE,
INvEsTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 91 (Michael J.
Moser ed. 2 nd ed. 1987).]
61See Chuang, supra note 17, at 512.
62 WANG, supra note 46, § 3.1.2, at 85.
63 See id.
64 id.
65 See id.; see also Gu, supra note 14, at 60 (stating that China's membership in the
WTO will force it to open its "severely restricted distribution channels" and that this

"will be the most profound change for foreign investors").
66 See also WANG, supra note 46, at 84 & n.4. See generally Folsom, supra note 24,
at 747.

2003]

FOREIGNDIRECTINVESTMENT IN CHINA

FDI vehicles) for which foreign-owned enterprises structure their
investments and operate. It must be noted that these investment

67
vehicles have been revised and amended on numerous occasions.

The most recent revisions were authorized in April of 2001.68
A. Wholly Foreign-OwnedEnterprises

Wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) are formed by
foreign investors with their own "capital" under Chinese law without
Chinese partner involvement in the

investment. 69 WFOEs are

generally formed as limited liability companies.70 As limited liability

companies, WFOEs become "legal persons" under the 1986 Chinese

Civil Law.7 ' Therefore, a WFOE may possess "the corporate
characteristics of continuity of life, centralization of management and
free transferability of interests., 72 But, "mergers and other important
changes in WFOEs must be approved by the relevant Chinese

authorities. 73
These investment vehicles came about by way of legislation
adopted on April 12, 1986 at the fourth session of the Sixth National
People's Congress (NPC).74 At this session it was stated that:
67

See generally supra note 54.

58 See ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.
69 See Demelle, supra note 10, at 338. Art. 8 of the Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprise
Law of the People'sRepublic of China. Id.
70
See Stephen C. Curley & Darren R Fortunato, Tax Considerationsfor Investors in
China: A PreliminaryLook, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 531, 545 (1995).
71 See Folsom, supra note 24, at 750.
72 Id. Just as under United States corporate regulations. See id.
73Id.
4 See Tai, supra note 31, at 30.
Under Article 57 of the Constitution of the PRC, the NPC is the highest State
legislative body. It is entitled to amend the Constitution and also to enact and
amend basic laws concerning criminal offences, civil affairs, State organs,
[etc.]. The standing committee is the permanent body of the NPC .... There
are approximately 3000 members comprising the NPC. Members hold office
for a term of five years .... The full NPC meets once a year for a period of 1
or 2 weeks. In theory, the NPC plays the role of parliament in the PRC. It is
the highest organ of State power. Apart from its legislative power, the NPC
also has the power to: (a) appoint and remove leaders and members of the
highest State organs, (b) make decisions on national development plans and
the State budget and (C) supervise the implementation of the Constitution.
WANG, supra note 46, § 1.2.4, at 20-21.
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with a view to expanding economic cooperation and
technological exchange with other countries and
promoting the development of its national economy, the
People's Republic of China permits foreign firms, other
economic entities or individuals . . . to set up
enterprises exclusively with foreign capital in China
and protects the lawful 75rights and interests of the
enterprises so established.
Before the WFOE law came into existence, very few companies were
permitted to do any form of business in China via a wholly owned
subsidiary model.76 Virtually all of FDI was required to be within the
confines of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).7 7 WFOEs are now the
wave of the future for FDI in China. Today (with the new and
improved FDI regulations in place) WFOEs are by far the most
popular investment vehicle for foreign investors in terms of contracts
which have been signed, and projects developed. 78 "Over 40 percent
more WFOE contracts than joint venture contracts were signed, and
the value of contracted investment79 in WFOEs was 70 percent more
than that in joint ventures in 2000."
The reasons for WFOE popularity are simple and quite
obvious. While the other two major investment vehicles 80 allow for
certain advantages, they also have a significant number of
disadvantages.
For instance, Equity Joint Venture Law (EJVL)
requires that foreign investors use certain equipment in investment that

75Tai, supra note 31, at 30 (quoting Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiye

Fa-The Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises-establishedApril 18, 1986); see also CHINA Bus. REv. 52-53 (Jul.Aug.
1986).
76
See Tai, supra note 31, at 30.
77See id. at 30-3 1; see infra Part III.C.

78 See ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14; see also James
Kynge & Edward Young, Wal-Mart wins go-aheadfor Beying opening, FIN. TIMEs,

Nov. 8, 2001, at 19 (describing the fact that Wal-Mart, a U.S. retail company, has
already opened its first supermarket in Beijing, and has secured permission from the
Chinese government to open five more supermarkets in Beijing within the next few
years). Wal-Mart has already opened several stores in the cities of Shenzhen,
Kunming, Fuzhou, Dalian, Shenyang, Shantou, and Dongguan (15 stores altogether).
These stores are WFOEs. See Kynge & Young, supra note 78, at 19.
79 Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.
80
See, e.g., infra Part IH.B.
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is "appropriate" to the needs of the Chinese government." Also,
something that has become extremely controversial and quite
problematic for many foreign investors is the fact that the EJVL also
requires that foreign investors allow their Chinese partners access to
all pertinent documentation regarding such things as industrial
property and know-how (i.e., research and development). 82
1. Recent WFOE Law Revisions Positively Affecting FDI
The National People's Congress (NPC) agreed to various
revisions of the WFOE law in October of 2000, "and subsequently
approved implementing regulations in April 2001. "83 These revisions
were predominantly very positive and pragmatic. 84 Some of the most
important positive revisions are as follows: (1) the export performance
requirements "(i.e., rules that required companies to export certain
percentages of [their] product[s])" 85 were eliminated-now exports are
generally encouraged but not obligatory;8 6 (2) advanced technology
and import substitution requirements were deleted8 7 (previously, the
law had stated that a WFOE must use advanced technology and
equipment "to develop new products, promote conservation, and
upgrade products for import substitution[]") 8 8-- now these activities
are generally encouraged but not obligatory;8 9 (3) foreign exchange
balance requirements were deleted (previously, the law had required
"that WFOEs balance their foreign exchange receipts and
expenditures"); 90 (4) prohibitions opposing WFOE direct domestic
81WANG,

supra note 46,

§ 3.4.3, at 106.

'2 See id. at 98.
83 See ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14. Please note
that Chinese laws are generally drafted very ubiquitously, therefore implementing
regulations are, on top of the Chinese laws, approved to provide more thorough

detailed guidance. See generally id.
84
See State Council Order # 301.
85
ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.

86 See id. "(It is unclear whether export performance requirements contained in
existing
contracts [will] remain valid.)" Id.
87
See id.
88 id.

89 See id.

90 Id. "The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had not seriously
enforced the balancing requirement in recent years, reflecting China's relative strong
foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, the law had remained on the books." Id.;
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sales of products without prior government approval were deleted; 9'
(5) the prerequisite "that raw materials and fuel for WFOEs be
obtained solely within China unless unavailable from the domestic
market," 92 and the requirement that "imports of capital equipment and
technology" for which could be obtained from the domestic
economy" 93 has been revoked; 94 (6) the requirement that "WFOEs
submit production and operation plans to local authorities" 95 was
deleted; (7) the requirement that "WFOEs sell products in accordance
with China's price control regulations or record the prices with price
control and tax authorities" 96 was deleted; and (8) the law regarding
particular "limitations or prohibitions to WFOE investment in certain
business lines, including media, real estate, communications and
transportation, and public utilities"9 7 were deleted from the
regulations. Now, most of the provisions relating to "limitations or
prohibitions" will be published in the Catalogue For The Guidance Of
Foreign Investment Industries (which is published annually) guiding
foreign investment in the particular industries listed. 98 The changes
recently made in the WFOE laws were colossal steps by the Chinese
government in showing the world that they are now extremely serious
to the
about restructuring their FDI laws for the purpose of opening-up
99
sentiment.
investor
positive
fostering
and
rest of the world
Essentially, the basic underlying theme spelled out by the
WFOE laws is that these enterprises will be developed while taking
Although these
China's national economy into consideration. 100
requirements are changing at a very rapid pace, WFOEs can be in
see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining that in 1996 China had a
foreign currency reserve totaling U.S. $800 billion).
91 See ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14. This is one of
the most monumental steps the Chinese government has taken, to date, with regard
to the open door policy and restructuring of its FDI laws in an effort to crystallize
foreign investor confidence and harmonize its laws with those of many western
countries. See generally supra Part [1.
92
ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.
93 Id.

94 This was, again, an incredible leap-forward for the Chinese government to make.

See generally id.
95
See generally id.; supra note 93 and accompanying text.
96
ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.
97
id.

See id.; supra note 63.
99 See generally supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
1
0oSee Tai, supra note 31, at 31-32.
98
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areas such as advanced technology and equipment "[and/]or [be
willing to] market all or most of their products outside China."'O
Furthermore, as of date, the progressive WFOE model for FDI in
China allows for complete protection of the investment, profits derived
from the investment,
and rights and interests of the foreign investor
02
law.
under Chinese
2. The WFOE Screening Process

Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises are not a favorite foreign
investment vehicle by the Chinese regulators. This is due to the fact
that there is not much of a mechanism for regulatory supervision by
governmental authorities once the WFOE has been approved. 10 3 Thus,
as a result, the foreign investor interested in this form of investment
vehicle must go through a stricter form of approval process, compared
to, e.g., Equity Joint Ventures. 104
There is a 90-day approval process for WFOEs for which
application to at least two approving authorities is required, "for the
record."' 05 The first step is for the foreign investor to apply to the
local government authority (above the county level).' 6 This
application should contain details regarding such items as: (1) "the
purpose . . . scope and scale of operations;"' 10 7 (2) what is to be

produced and/or manufactured and what types of technology and
equipment are to be used; 0 8 (3) expected percentage of output to
overseas vs. domestic markets; 1' 9 (4) "area of land and land
requirements;"' "10 and (5) infrastructure prerequisites required for the
enterprise to stay viable (i.e., water, fuel, public utility, electricity,
coal, gas, etc., requirements)."' The local government agency is
1o1

Id.; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 87-88

and accompanying text.
2
'0
See Tai, supra note 31, at 31-32.
03
See generally WANG, supra note 46, § 4.9.1, at 131.

'04 See id. at 133.

105See id; see also Folsom, supra note 24, at 750.

" See WANG, supra note 46, § 4.9.2, at 132.

107

Id.

1os See id.
109 See id.
11O
Id.
11 See id.
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normally given 30 days, upon receipt of the report, to make a2 final
determination regarding the feasibility of the proposed WFOE.II
If, and when, the local authority approves of the proposed
project-better known as preliminary approval--then the foreign
investor is required to apply (depending on the situation, locality, and
type of enterprise) for final approval." 13 There are several documents
which are required for this final approval process, they include: (1) the
actual application; 1 4 (2) "the written response of the local people's
government [above the county level] in the locality of the proposed
enterprise;"' "15 (3) a feasibility study; 1 6 (4) articles of association of
the enterprise;" l7 (5) a list of legal representatives and/or candidates
for the board of directors; 1 8 (6) a detailed list of goods and materials
desired to be imported;" 9 and (7) any other necessary documents
required by government authorities. 2 0 All of these documents must
either be 2written
in Mandarin Chinese or be translated into Mandarin
1
Chinese.'
The safest and most conducive way to be granted approval by
MOFTEC is to specify in the formal application that the investment
and/or project involves certain manifest aims. These aims could
include, e.g., aiding with the development of the Chinese economy,
helping to create an ecologically sustainable development, the usage of
high technology and equipment, and/or the exportation of the majority
of all the products produced in China to other countries. 122 Once the

application has been approved and an approval certificate has been
issued by MOFTEC, the applicant should file, within 30 days, a
112 See

id.

113See John Zhengdong Huang, China On The Horizon: Exploring Current Legal
Issues: An Introduction To Foreign Investment Laws In The People's Republic Of
China, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 471,478-79 (1995).
114 See id. at 479.
115WANG,

supra note 46, § 4.9.3, at 132.

116 See Huang, supranote 113, at 479.
17

1 See id; see also WANG, supra note 46, §4 at 132.
118 See Huang, supranote 113, at 479; see also WANG, supra note 46, §4 at 132.
119 See Huang, supra note 113, at 479; see also WANG, supra note 46, §4 at 132.
120
See Huang, supra note 113, at 479; see also WANG, supra note 46, §4 at 132.
121See Mo, supra note 8, at 283.
122

WANG, supra note 46, § 4.9.5, at 133. The most interesting of these concepts is

the precept of positive approval based on the guarantee that a majority of the
products produced will be exported to other countries outside of China. See supra
Part III.
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written request to register the enterprise and receive a business license
23
with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC).1
When a business license has been issued by SAIC (thereby
legitimizing the enterprise) the WFOE must register with the local tax
authority prior to thirty days of receipt of the license 124 The foreign
investor should propose the general terms which the enterprise will
operate in the application to SAIC. 2 5 Generally speaking, the terms
of operation set out by the enterprise will also be subject to approval
by the government. 126 Finally, "[n]o minimum capital requirements
[will be] imposed" and the sum of registered capital which the
enterprise will use to start its operations shall coincide with the scale
and scope of operations.127 It must be noted that there are certain
sectors of industry which WFOEs are either heavily discouraged or
altogether barred from operating in.' 28 WFOEs are heavily
discouraged from operating in the sectors of transport facilities, public
utilities, real estate, leasing and trust investment.1 29 If a potential
WFOE decides to apply to enter one of these sectors, MOFTEC will
30
strictly scrutinize the application prior to its approval/disapproval.
On the other hand, potential WFOEs are altogether prohibited from
applying for investment approval in the sectors of "newspapers,
publishing, broadcasting, television or films; 131 domestic

'z3 See Huang, supra note 113, at 479.
124 WANG, supra note 46, § 4.9.6, at 134.
'25 See Huang, supra note 113, at 479.
126See id.

127 See id.
128 See WANG, supra note 46, § 4.9.5, at 134 (detailing that FDI in various industrial
sectors is generally divided-up into four main sectors: encouraged, permitted,
restricted, and prohibited).

'29 See id. at 135.
13 See id.
131But see, e.g., Around the world: Chairman Murdock Strikes a Deal, 17 EARTH
ISLAND J. 1, 15 (2002).

News Corp. media mogul Rupert Murdoch has finally attained his
long-sought goal of extending his communications empire to
China. Murdock's Star TV has been granted permission to transmit
to cable viewers in 'a restricted area in Guangdong province.'
China asked only one thing in return: that Murdoch ensure that a
China Central Television channel be widely available in the U.S.
To accommodate China's rulers, Murdoch removed the BBC
broadcast documentaries critical of the Chinese government. Star
TV's pitch was doubtless enhanced when Murdoch's son . . .
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postal services

and

telecommunications;, 33 and other industries that the Chinese
[g]overmment prohibits a sole investment enterprise from
establishing."'3
B. Equity Joint Ventures

Equity joint ventures (EJVs) have traditionally received the
most attention, , before the wholly owned foreign enterprise became
the new "hot" investment vehicle for both foreign investors and their
Chinese counterparts.' 35 The first series of joint venture laws-Law of
the People's Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Joint Equity
Enterprises-wasadopted on July 1, 1979 "at the 2 nd Session of the 5 th

openly criticized the Falun Gong, an outlawed religious movement
that has been brutally suppressed by Beijing.
Id.
132 But see, e.g., supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing Wal-Mart's
decisive entry into the Chinese commercial market).
Also, other foreign
international commercial supermarket chains, such as Carrefour, a French
conglomerate, have been acting within the Chinese domestic "scene" for some time
now. See Kynge & Young, supra note 78, at 19. So, there are exceptions to the rule.
See id.; See also Mike Troy, Wal-Mart to open five in Bei/ing, DSN RETAILING
TODAY, Nov. 19, 2001, at 2 (detailing that since China's admittance into the WTO,
there will be fewer restrictions on foreign business ownership). And, in the near
future there will be 'reduced import taxes, upgraded distribution infrastructure and
more foreign investment....'" Id. (quoting Linda Kristiansen, of UBS Warburg).
133But see, e.g., Shu-Ching Jean Chen, CT Ruling Upends Local Telecom
Investment, THE DAILY DEAL, Dec. 27, 2001.
In February 2001, two foreign investors (along with two politically
well-connected Chinese commercial banks . . .)made the first

direct equity investment in China's still protected telecom sector.
The two foreign investors splashed out $325 million for a
combined 12% stake in China Netcom Corp. Ltd., a telecom
upstart set to challenge State-owned monolith China Telecom. Id.
While this is basically a joint venture, and not a WFOE, it still
represents the fact that while the telecommunications sector is
considered off limits to FDI, there are exceptions.
See id.; see also infra Part III.B. (describing equity joint ventures in detail).
134 Chen, supra note 133.
135 See also Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14 (stating
that Joint Ventures are now considered the second most popular foreign investment
vehicle in China, behind the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise). See generally
Moser, supra note 60, at 100.
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'
37
National
Congress,
were laterPeople's
amendedCongress.
on April' 4,
1990 "at People's
the Yd Session
of 136
the and
7 h National
This came about by the advent of normalized trade relations between
the United States and China in 1979 38 These laws were designed to
attract foreign investment, capital, and expertise (i.e., know-how).
EJVs have since been a major form of foreign investment. By 1987,
over 3,210 EJVs were established in China.139 (Editor's Note: this
source does not say this where did the 3,210 number come from?)
Because of their popularity, the EJV laws are by far the most
developed of all Chinese foreign investment laws. Therefore, EJVs
quickly became the main FDI tool for ventures between Chinese and
foreign enterprises, and are now only second in popularity to
WFOEsa4
i
While there is no true definition of what an EJV should
actually be, there are some fundamental criteria establishing certain
basic characteristics. These udesuch characteristics as: (1)both
the foreign and Chinese parties (EJV partners) should share in the

profits of the enterprise, along with bearing the risks of loss, in
proportion to their contribution of registered capital;' 4 ' (2) the EJV
should be "established within China's territory in accordance with
relevant Chinese' 142
and
subject
theregisteredis
jurisdiction aand
protection
of Chinese law; law
(3)
the isEJV
shouldto be
Chinese
legal
person thereby taking the form of a limited liability enterprise;143 and
(4) "the foreign investor must not contribute less than 25 percent of
the venture's registered capital."' 144 An EJV cannot reduce its
registered capital, once it has registered with the Chinese
13 WANG, supra note 46, § 3.2.1, at 94.
3 Id. at 94-95. A conclusive Chinese text of these Sessions, with an English

translation, can be found in CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION 1-7 (Foreign
Languages
Press 1982).
8
13
See generally Folsom, supra note 24, at 747.
139
See, e.g., id.
140
See Moser, supra note 60, at 10 1.
141
See WANG,supra note 46, § 3.2.2, at 95.
142id.

143 See id.
144See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 70, at 534. "Registered capital means the

total amount of contributed capital that is registered at the registration and
administration Office for the establishment of the Equity Joint Venture and is the
total amount of capital subscribed by the parties." Id.; see also WANG, supra note
46, § 3.2.2, at 95.
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authorities.145 Also, if there is a subsequent increase in registered
capital, the EJV's board of directors must approve the increased
capital, as well as the authority for which originally examined and
approved of the venture (i.e., the Registration and Administration
Office for the Establishment of the EJV). 14 6 Nonetheless, being
economically feasible, an EJV is also expected to assist with the
development of China's economy and carryout at least one of a
number of possible positive tasks. These tasks include: (1) "adopt
advanced technical equipment and scientific management;" 4 7 (2)
promote commercial and technological renovation; 148 (3) "produce
export oriented products;"' 149 and/or (4) provide the means for
organizing and training managerial and technical personnel. 150 These
tasks must not only be "advanced"
in nature, but also must be in line
15 1
with China's economic needs.
1. Recent Equity Joint Venture Law Revisions Positively Affecting

FDI
Up

until recently, foreign investors had favored using the EJV
vehicle.' 5 EJVs were seen by the Chinese government as a way to
prop-up under performing and ailing domestic enterprises. 153 In a
nutshell, EJVs were a sort of rescue package handed to the enterprise
by the government at the bequest of the foreign investor. In March
2001, the NPC made some minor revisions to the Law of the People's
Republic of China on Sino-ForeignJoint Equity Enterprises.15 4 While
the changes were relatively minor in nature, the "Chinese media
heralded the revised law as 'a milestone in the country's quest to
145 See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 70, at 534.

'46 See id.
147 Huang, supra note 113, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 46, § 3.2.3, at
96.
148 See Huang, supra note 113, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 46, §
3.2.3, at 96.
149
Huang, supra note 113, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 46, § 3.2.3, at
96.
150See Huang, supra note 113, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 46, §
3.2.3, at 96.
151
See WANG, supra note 46, § 3.2.3, at 96.
152 See supra Part II.A.

153
See generally ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes,May 2001, supra note 14.
154 See id.; see also supra notes 136-37.
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provide a legal framework that will better serve the development of
joint ventures in China."' "55 But, the EJV law has yet to be finalized
and implemented. 156 Due to China's admittance into the WTO, it is
soon expected that more precise and sweeping amendments will be
approved 7to provide healthier incentives to potential foreign
15
investors.
Several positive and pragmatic revisions of the amended EV
law have been made to date, including: (1) the requirement that ENs
"either procure raw materials, fuel and some capital goods from the
domestic market or source from the international market using onhand foreign currency"' 158 has been deleted--the amended law allows
sourcing from the international market, but adds the provision that the
procurement process must be done in a manner that effectuates probity
and impartiality; 159 (2) no longer request that EJVs "file production
[and/or] business plans with government offices and implement plans
through business contracts;"' 16 (3) now all insurance plans of an EJV
will be provided by a local Chinese insurance company in the territory
where the enterprise is operating-the old EJV law more loosely
decreed that insurance must simply be provided by a Chinese
insurance company. 161

155 ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.

156See id.
' See State to Revise Related Laws for New FDI Model, ASLAINFO DAILY CHINA
NEWS, Sept. 26, 2001, at 1. "China examined over 1,500 laws, regulations and
documents... and found that over 500 of them should be eliminated around 200
should be revised according to... (WTO) rules, and over 20 new regulations should
be laid down." Id. "China will strive to complete the revision and drafting ... [of
the] laws concerning foreign-funded enterprises that did not adhere to WTO rules...
."

Id.

1-5ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes,May 2001, supra note 14.
159 See id.
'60 Id.
This is a remarkable and rather progressive amendment showing the
governments willingness to allow some form of foreign investment autonomy. See
id. It is also more of a counter-strike against what the WTO will soon be
demanding. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
161
See ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14.
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The EJV ScreeningProcess

The first and most basic step of an interested potential foreign
investor is to locate an appropriate partner.' 62 Obviously, this first
step is essential and absolutely crucial in developing a viable EJV.
Locating an appropriate partner is relatively simple, especially since
China is in great need of foreign capital infusions and western
technologies. 163 The immense demand for these resources by way of
FDI is far greater than the present supply. 164 Thus, as the government
hastily opens China's gates, most of the domestic Chinese companies
lie in wait for opportunities to establish EJVs with foreign enterprises
so they too can enjoy the potential profits and derivative benefits of
such an undertaking. 165 For example:
China is likely to have a domestic television industry
strong enough to be a big export [sic] of cheap sets.
Japanese firms will have a stake in that []: they are
providing the technology now. Toshiba, Japan Victor
Company Matsushita, Sanyo and Sony are all starting
joint ventures with Chinese partners. Of the 2.8m sets
sold last year, 1.5m were supplied by domestic joint
166
ventures, the biggest of which is Hitachi's at Fujian.
An EJV must be approved by MOFTEC before it can be
established. 67 In the preliminary approval phase, the Chinese partner
must follow certain procedures and must provide certain materials: (1)
an application for the establishment of the EJV; (2) a EJV agreement
162

See generally, e.g., Keqiang Guo & Kaiyman Tao, The Chinese-ForeignJoint

Venture: Law And
163

Practice,3 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 309, 317-19 (1994).

But see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (explaining how FDI is steadily

increasing and describing the vastness of the Chinese FDI market). See generally
Gao & Tao, supra note 162, at 310-21.
164 See Mo, supra note 8 (discussing the relatively large currency reserve China has
established).
165
166

See WANG, supra note 46, § 3.3.1.1, at 98.

Tai, supra note 31, at 29 (citing a relatively old, yet very relevant quote from THE

Apr. 6, 1985); see also Karby Leggett, JP. Morgan Chase Seeks
Growth in China, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2-3, 2001, at 20 (highlighting the fact that even
major investment banks, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, are partnering-up with local
Chinese banks and financial firms in creating joint ventures).
167 See Tai, supra note 31, at 29. Authorized local authorities can mean provincial,
county, township, etc. See Huang, supra note 113, at 475.
ECONOMIST,
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and articles of association signed by agents (authorized
representatives) of the proposed venture must be submitted; (3) the
parties (Chinese and foreign) must submit a joint feasibility study
report; (4) a project proposal; (5) a letter of intent or memorandum of
understanding stating that, at the present time, this is not a binding
agreement but a mere statement of the parties intentions; (6) a list of
candidates for board of directors and highest executive positions; and
(7) various written opinions by local government agencies for the
jurisdiction where the proposed EJV is to be established. 68 All
documents must be written in Mandarin Chinese. 169 After the
application has been reviewed and approved by authorized local
authorities, it must then be submitted to MOFTEC for final
approval. 170 MOFTEC will have three months to make a final
determination.' 7 1 However, the time for approval could be extended,
if the Chinese authorities find something they would want investigate
further. 172 Finally, if approved, the parties to the EJV must conduct
work relevant to the feasibility study, negotiate and sign an EJV
agreement and73 other related contracts, and posit the articles of
incorporation. 1

Generally, projects are denied on a certain number of principal
reasons. The main reasons for denial of an EJV are: (1) that the
proposed EJV would be "detrimental to China's sovereignty;"' 174 (2)
there's some a violation of Chinese law; 175 (3) "non-conformity with
the requirements for the development of China's national
economy;"' 176 (4) the proposed enterprise would possibly propagate

'1 See Huang,supra note 113, at 475.
16 see id.
170 See
171 See

WANG, supra note 46,

§ 3.3.1, at 99.

id.at 100.

See Guo & Tao, supra note 162, at 319-20. Due to the slow beaurocratic
machinery at work, this could take some time. See id.
173 See id.
174 WANG, supra note 46, § 3.5.2, at 108-09.
172

175 See id. at 109.
76
1

id.

118 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol.3:1

environmental pollution;' 77 and/or (5) when the agreement
between
178
the Chinese and foreign enterprise is unconscionable.
Once a certificate of approval to establish an EJV has been
received, an EJV is required to register with the local bureau of the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC). 179 This
must be done within one month of receipt of the certificate of
approval. 80 When applying for registration, the parties to the EJV
should provide, e.g.: (1) "the document of approval;"''8 1 (2) "copies of
the Chinese and foreign-language [EJV] texts of the joint venture
agreement, the joint venture contract, and the company charter;"'182 (3)
"a copy of the foreign party's business license or other similar
84
documents;"' 83 and (4) "a complete registration form, in triplicate."'
The day when the business license for operation has been issued is the
day that the investment becomes a legal entity with protection under
the auspices of the PRC laws. 85 Generally speaking, it could take
anywhere from six to twelve months, from beginning to end, for this
process to transpire. 186
Without going into detail regarding percentages of capital
contributions as to the value of the investment or standards of
registration fees, it is important to note a few important fine points on
EJV capital contribution regulations. It is essential that the parties
applying for the EJV pledge their own capital for the venture.'18 This
means that the capital pledged should not be mortgaged, have a lien
placed against it, be secured by a creditor, and be free of all
encumbrances. 188 Capital contributions can be in the form of cash,
177 See id. This is an especially "hot" item on the list due to the fact that Beijing is

trying extremely hard to clean-up the environment and strengthen environmental
regulations before the 2008 Olympics in China. See Angela Leary, Ready, Set, Go,
ASIAN
Bus., Oct. 2001, at 61.
178 See WANG, supra note 46, § 3.5.2, at 109.
179 See Huang, supra note 113, at 475.
180 See id.
181 id.
182 id.
183Id.
184ld.

185 See Guo & Tao, supra note 162, at 320.
186 See generally Huang, supra note 113, at 475 (describing procedures

establishing an equity joint venture).
187 See Guo & Tao, supra note 162, at 320.
188See id.

for
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equipment, buildings, and/or intangible property such as expertise and
know-how, intellectual property, land use rights, etc.1 89 If there is a
determined form of investment other than cash, then both the parties
must agree to this, and it would also have to be approved by the
authorized examination and approval authority. 190
There are many advantages and disadvantages of choosing an
EJV over a WFOE. The most obvious advantage is that the Chinese
party will be very helpful in assisting with obtaining the necessary
government approvals to necessitate the project/investment. This will
come about due to the Chinese partner's guanxi191 and familiarity with
the complex procedures inherent in dealing with the multi-layered
Chinese bureaucracy.' 92 On the other hand, there are also some major
disadvantages of developing an EJV (compared to a WFOE). The
most obvious disadvantage is that the foreign investor will have to
"transfer" technology and know-how over to the Chinese party, which
means that there is a sharing of asset's (including, e.g., research and
development activities) at the behest of the foreign investor.' 93
Foreign investors would also have to consult with the Chinese partner
94
when dealing with management, facility, and production issues.
And the Chinese government would have significantly more oversight
95
and control over an EJV versus and WFOE. 1

"9 See WANG, supra note 46, § 3.4.3, at 106-107.

See id. at 107.
Telephone Interview with Dr. Ronald R. Robel, Director, Critical Languages
Center, International Honors Program, Asian Studies Program, University of
'9

191

Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Al. (Feb. 27, 2002) (stating that guanxi are Connections

fostered via friendships-in China these take considerable time and skill in
developing, especially at high levels); see also Bee Chen Gob, Trade And Investment
Negotiation With The Chinese, in CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: TRADE

AND INVEsTMENT 39 (K C D M Wilde ed., 2000) (explaining that many businesses
start off business relations by way of relying on guanxi).
192 See WANG, supra note 46, at 97-98.
'93 See supraPart III.B.
194 See WANG, supranote 46, at 98.

195 See id.
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C. A Short Note On "Special Areas "-Special Economic Zones &
CoastalEconomic Open Areas
A major by-product of the China's "open door policy" is the
highly publicized development of "Special Areas" including "Special
196
Economic Zones" (SEZs) and "Coastal Economic Open Areas."'
SEZs are clever tools used by the Chinese government for which the
main purpose is to act "as 'windows' to the outside world."' 97 These
are, for the most part, to necessitate domestic employment
opportunities and to draw-in much needed know-how and technology
by way of FDI.198 They are essentially defined areas existing
throughout China, which offer numerous and rather large forms of
special incentives and preferential treatment to foreign investors
located within in specified area. There are two broad principles for
which the SEZs operate: (1) "foreign investors and enterprises located
in the special areas are to enjoy preferential treatment in the form of
lower tax rates and easier entry and exit procedures;"' 99 and (2) "the
local government authorities are to have greater 20decision-making
0
power than as previously available to them in China."
There are several "Special Areas" that have been administered
to date. All of these areas benefit from particular types of special
regulations and policies for which highlight each particular areas

196 See, e.g., Elson Pow & Michael J. Moser, Law andInvestment in China's Special

Investment Areas, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 199 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press
2 nd

ed. 1987).

197 Raymond W.K. Lau, Book Review, HEAD & HAND: ASIAN ECONOMIES, 128
(reviewing WEIPENG WU, PIONEERING ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA'S SPECIAL

ECONOMIC ZONES (1999)); see Mark B. Baker, Forgotten Legal China, 17 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 363, 389 (1995) (noting that the basic policy for SEZs was to experiment
with the market economy and to attract foreign investments).
198See Lau, supra note 197.
'99 Id. See also Stephen C. Curley & Darren R. Fortunato, Tax Considerationsfor
Investors in China: A PreliminaryLook, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 531, 551

(1995).

200

Id.

The income tax rate on a Foreign Investment Enterprise and a
Foreign Enterprise with an establishment or site in China engaged
in production or business operations... may be entitled to various
tax rate reductions and/or holidays depending on the requirements
of the region in which they are established. Id.
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comparative advantage.2 °'
They include the five SEZs
(Shenzhen-the first, largest, and most successful of the SEZs; also,
Shantou, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Hainan Island),20 2 and fourteen
"Coastal Economic Open Areas" (CEOAs), 203 which were opened (as
part of the "open door policy") for fostering trade and investment in
1984.204 There are a few important differences between SEZs and
CEOAs. SEZs were primarily formed for the purpose of "general
development. 20 5 With this in mind, foreign capital can be invested in
many ways, such as in "industry, agriculture, animal husbandry,
aquaculture, tourism, housing, the building industry, high-grade
technology development"' 206 and numerous other activities. Almost all
imported capital and consumer goods are exempt from customs
duties. 20 7 Presently, in SEZs, investors pay a modest 15% income tax

201See Bin Xue Sang, Another Special Economic Zone in China? - An Analysis of
the SpecialRegulations and Policyfor Shanghai'sPudong New Area, 14 J. INTL. L.
Bus. 130, n.3 (1993) (remarking that there is no clear definition of what an SEZ
actually is). A comparative advantage is:
[when] a particular country, while maybe not as efficient as other
countries, focuses on what it does best--and invests in what it
does best----even though it may still produce a product less
efficiently than another country. What then happens is other
countries will then shift production to other areas where their
expertise and skills will be of better use maximizing efficiencies in
a less competitive environment.
George 0. White Ill, From Snowplows To Siopao-Trying To Compete In A Global
Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 TULSA J. COM. & INT'L. L. 177, 19596 & n.146 (2001).
2w See Tai, supra note 31, at 20 (explaining that Shenzhen was the first of the SEZs,
established in 1980; and the rest were established and then all elevated to provincial
status in 1988).
203 These are also known as "Coastal Cities." See id. CEOAs have spread to twentyseven provinces and cities throughout the PRC. See Guo & Tao, supra note 162, at
320.
204 See Tai, supra note 31, at 20. The fourteen coastal cities are Dalian, Beihai,
Qinhuangdoa, Tianjin, Zhanjiang, Yantai, Qindao, Lianyangang, Nantong, Shanghai,
Nighbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou. See id.
2 See Tai, supra note 31, at 20.
2 Tai, supra note 31, at 20. For example, China's Silicon Valley or Shanghai
which are considered "the" places for future high-tech development in China, and
most of Asia. See China's Silicon Road, ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 15,
2001, at 1.
207 Except for such things as alcohol and cigarettes, and other "luxury" goods. See
generally Tai, supra note 31, at 20.
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rate.20 8 Also, the Unified Foreign Tax Law 20 9 implies that local taxes

on foreign investors can be waived or reduced by the local
governments of the provinces and municipalities where the SEZ
exist.
But, government ministry officials are contemplating phasing
out the preferential tax rate in order to harmonize domestic tax rates,
thereby complying with WTO policies. 2 11 Ultimately, this will work
to the disadvantage of foreign companies already invested in SEZs and
create a less attractive opportunity for potential future foreign
investors. 22122 Nevertheless, it is clear that the tax policies will soon be
revised to reflect China's determination to be a major player within the
WTO. The impact, to SEZ local economies, may be immense by not
having added tax perks to draw-in foreign investment.213
On the other hand, in CEOAs investment must be "directed
towards production and research and therefore [is] most specifically
aimed at the development of new technology and new products and
208

See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 199, at 551-55;

HENRY

R.

ZHENG, CHINA'S

277-80 (1988).
See Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with

CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW
209

Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises,China Laws for Foreign Bus. 31-745
(Dec. 13, 1993); Curley & Fortunato, supra note 199, at 546 & 112.
210 See Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises
with
Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, supra note 209 (stating that for
practical purposes---to continue to compete against other SEZs & encourage local
investment--the local authorities usually always waive or reduce taxes on FDI in
these areas).
211 See James Kynge, China Ready to Scrap Tax Breaks for Foreign Companies'
Special Economic Zones, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at 15 (stating that "the five
SEZs - the booming southern cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou and the
island of Hainan - may find it more difficult to attract foreign investment after they
are stripped of their power to award tax perks."). The vote by the National People's
Congress to ratify the agreement to phase out preferential tax treatment in the SEZs
could take place any day now. See id.
212 See id. The harmonization of local (Chinese) rules with national laws to conform
to WTO standards is a perplexing and extremely time consuming task being carried
out by relevant government authorities. See id. But, one unidentified Chinese
official stated that "[w]hy should we continue to subject Chinese companies to
disadvantages even after we have opened our big gate to foreign competition and
joined the WTO? ...It would not be fair." Id.

See generally id. One very interesting twist here is that the inevitable tax
revisions could also sack the prevalent abuse of what is called "round-tripping."
"'[R]ound-tripping' [is when] Chinese groups set up shelf companies in Hong Kong,
which they then use as mainland investment vehicles in order to qualify for 'foreign'
rates of tax." Id.
213
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industries. ' '2 14 Correspondingly, only imported capital goods are
considered to be exempt from customs duties in CEOAs. Also, only
approved enterprises in CEOAs, strictly in the areas of economic and
technological development, can take advantage of the preferential tax
treatment granted SEZs 2 1 5 -all other enterprises not approved for the
lower tax rate must pay a higher rate of 24%.216 Nonetheless, CEOAs
2 17
will also be hit by the same tax law revisions as the SEZs.
Furthermore, the pending ratification of new tax revisions fostering
harmonization of domestic tax laws, thereby complying with WTO
playing field, could mildly chill foreign
policies and creating a level
2 18
investor interest in CEOAs.
All of these areas deal with the governments theme of "spacial
placement" and planning activities centered on the unique qualities of
each specific "Special Area." 219 "Spatial placement . . . refers to
The whole idea of
active state initiatives in site selection ....
"spacial placement" is to look at proximity pertaining to economic,
geographical, political, and cultural proximity.22 A good example of
how this idea works, in fostering FDI growth, can be seen by the
example of Shenzhen.2 2 An SEZ was established in Shenzhen by the
Chinese government and put under the newly created Administrative
2232
Committee of the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province. 2 3
Because Shenzhen was within close proximity to Hong Kong, many
foreign enterprises in Hong Kong slowly relocated their "low-tech,
labour-intensive industries across the border.., stock and barrel...
214

Tai, supra note 31, at 21.

215See id; ZHENG, supra note 208, at 280-81.
216

See Huang, supra note 113, at 483.
217 See Kynge, supra note 211, at 15.
218 See id. It must be noted that the new WTO sanctioned FDI tax policies would
most severally hurt the Chinese government's foreign investment push to the west,
in
new development zones such as Lhasa & Lanzhou. See id.
219
See Lau, supra note 197, at 128; supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text. See
generally China wooing FDIfor neglected region, BUSINESSLINE, Oct. 6., 2001, at 1
(describing that the ambitious Great Western Development or "Go West" project
started by the Chinese government to steer foreign investment may be in jeopardy
once domestic laws are harmonized to comply with WTO regulations).
220 Lau, supra note 197, at 128.
221 See id.

222 See generally note 202 and accompanying text (briefly discussing Shenzhen).
223 See Pow & Moser, supra note 196, at 200. Prior to being named an SEZ,
Shenzhen was considered a "trade and investment zone." Id.
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[so that by the early 1990's] 96% of Shenzhen's textiles and dyeing,
[and] 95% of garment joint-ventures were financed by Hong Kong
investors. ,,224 The reason for Shenzhen's incredible success is because
225
of its geographical and economic proximity to Hong Kong.
Because of these factors, Shenzhen has facilitated ties to a highly
leveraged and developed foreign investment pool (Hong Kong),
thereby maximizing its comparative advantages (i.e., much lower
wages, relatively modest tax rates, a vast supply of raw materials and
manpower, etc.) combined with a positively regulated investment area
(the Shenzhen SEZ).2 26 This is exactly why the "SEZs" and "CEOAs"
were contrived and developed by the Chinese government--regulatory
efficiency creating an investment friendly environment.
IV.
UNDERSTANDING CHINESE CULTURE'S PLACE IN
FDI DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS
We do not live in a perfect world. While the overwhelming
majority of FDI ventures/projects in China turn-out to be successful
(without any problems hindering them), there will always be that one
venture/project that will go bad, for which must be resolved in the best
interests of the parties involved. Such problems as government
expropriation; 2 27 obscurity of the law and problems with the
government's reliance on a non-public operational code, rather than

224

See Lau, supra note 197, at 129.

225

See id.

226

See id.

227

Expropriation is "to take possession of, especially for public use by the right of

eminent domain, thus divesting the title of the private owner . . . to dispossess of
ownership." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 683 (3d ed.
1996). It must be noted that Chinese law forbids nationalization of FDI ventures,
including joint ventures, equity joint ventures, and wholly foreign owned enterprises.
See Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14. However, there
are special circumstances when this would be allowed, including "national security
considerations and obstacles to large civil engineering projects." Id. "There have
been no cases of outright expropriation of [FDI] since China opened to the outside in
1979." Id. But, if there was, and it could be proved, Chinese law allows for
compensation of expropriated foreign investments, but has, so far, failed to define
what the actual terms of compensation would be. See id.; Folsom, supra note 24, at
761-64 (detailing anti-expropriation laws in The Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises (1986)).
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publicly accessible regulations (i.e., lack of transparency); 22 8
uncoordinated laws and policies at different levels of the Chinese
bureaucracy (i.e., administrative and political control); 229 inconsistent
interpretations of the law; 230 a lack of fiduciary duty rules with respect
to joint venture partners; 2-' and profit restrictions on investments, 232 to
name just a few, 233 are still major concerns that foreign investors
should be keenly aware of when investing in China. A good example
is what happened to McDonald's in Beijing:
Beijing recently ordered McDonald's to vacate its prize
location in a shopping district near Tiananmen Square.
The American fast-food chain not only has its largest
restaurant on the site, as a commitment to the Chinese
market, but also signed a twenty-year lease... They
[McDonald's] have been ordered off the property to
make way for a development project. .. As a result,
McDonald's, one of China's earliest investors, is
reviewing its China investment strategy. [Meanwhile]

2n See Pat K- Chew, Political Risk and US. Investments in China: Chimera of
Protectionand Predictability?,34 VA. J. INT'L L. 622 (1994). "Conflict between

the Chinese and Western approaches to the law is not helped by the Chinese practice
of citing unpublished laws."
"tUnder the Western notion of law, this practice
clashes head on with due process .... " Id.
229 See Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In A
Transitional Economy, 5 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 488-90 (1996) (stating that
"[d]espite provisions in the Chinese Constitution to the contrary, the confusing and
often overlapping lines of authority remains a problematic issue facing China's
enterprises."); Daniel C.K. Chow, The Limited PartnershipJoint Venture Model In
The People's Republic Of China, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 39 (1998).
230 See Han. supra note 229, at 491-92.
231 See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Limited PartnershipJoint Venture Model In The
People's Republic Of China, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 38 (1998)("Current
Chinese law does not appear to have an equivalent concept to fiduciary duty. While
this means that all non-control groups are exposed to the risks associated with the
lack of such duty, the local partner in the type of foreign-controlled joint venture...
is particularly vulnerable because of the amount of control vested in the foreign
investor. This lack of general protections most clearly exposes the non-control group
to risks where the control group seeks to intentionally exploit the non-control
group.")
232 See Henry J. Graham, ForeignInvestment Laws Of ChinaAnd The United States:
A ComparativeStudy, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 277 (1996).
233 Another problem is the concept of requiring "'foreign operators... [to] generate
at least half their sales volume from Chinese-made goods."' See id.
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[o]ther possible investors, like Ford Motor Company,
remain on the sidelines. 234 There is no doubt that this
creates an environment of "business disenchantment"
regarding the Chinese investment market. 23 5 Thus,

before a foreign investor decides to enter the Chinese
market and begin operations, there are many cultural
and legal concepts for which it should be acutely aware
of. So, over a long period of time, the foreign firm will
begin to better understand the relational conditions and

environment they are in. 236 Therefore, the longer the
foreign enterprise functions in China, the more
competent and efficient it will become in navigating the
Chinese bureaucratic malaise and avoiding problematic
situations. 237

This ranges from understanding basic

concepts of Chinese culture, to understanding how to
handle arbitration, or, if necessary, litigation issues.
A. Chinese Culture and Business Relationships: How These Factors
Affect FDI Negotiations

Understanding Chinese culture is vital in understanding how to
effectively negotiate in and out of business deals in China. The way
Chinese attorneys and businessmen cultivate long lasting relationships
and

234

negotiate

business

transactions

will

often

baffle

an

Id. But see, e.g., id. at 268-69.
One bright shining example for the world and the rest of China to
behold is Guangdong province, the mainland[s] alter ego of its
vibrant neighbor, Hong Kong. Guangdong is blazing the path for
the rest of China, providing regulations governing . . . joint
ventures, the transfer of land-use rights [etc.] . . . Western legal

concepts have taken hold in Shenzhen [as well], courtesy of Hong
Kong .

.

. Whether China can emulate Guangdong's success and

adaptability remains to be seen,
See also supra note 21 and accompanying text (talking about Wal-Mart's entry into
China).
235 See id. at 277. While such uncertainty may not forebode well for the near term
investment, the Chinese government is hastily trying to create a much improved
investor environment. See supra Part HI.
236 See Rajib N. Sanyal & Turgut Guvenli, American Firms In China: Issues In
ManagingOperations,MULTINATIONAL Bus. REv., Fall 2001, at 40, 41.
237 See id.
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unknowledgeable foreigner. Thus, there are a few concepts that must
be understood by a potential foreign investor (and its attorneys
structuring the deal) before negotiating a project/venture in China.

1. Face
It is no overstatement to declare that saving face is by far the
238
most important concept in Chinese society. Face is a Confucian
concept basically meaning "prestige" and "personal character." 2 39 A
loss of face by a person can be extremely detrimental to one's ability
to adequately negotiate a deal. Direct and confrontational behavior is
inherently part of most foreign legal and business systems. 240 But
"[c]hinese negotiators consider direct and confrontational behavior as
rude, offensive and losing face." 24 1 Because of the whole concept of
saving face, many Chinese are particularly sensitive and will quickly
take offense to any sort, even if unintentional, of remarks which could
cause them to lose face. Thus, when negotiating with Chinese
counterparts, it would behoove the foreign investor and their
attorney(s) to take heed in understanding the behavior surrounding the
concept of face during negotiations, or else cultural "confusions"
could lead to greater "frustrations" ultimately undermining the
investment/venture opportunity.
2. Guanxi
Guanxi is another very important part of Chinese culture that
will inevitably play a major role in both business and legal
negotiations, and in fostering business relationships in China. At its
as
essence, Guanxi is a derivative of a friendly relationship to be used 242
out.
carried
be
to
favors
for
requests
for
allowing
apparatus
an
Guanxi is "a special relationship individuals have with each other in

238 See generally LI, supra note 24, at 340 (explaining that Confucius was born in

551 B.C. and Died in 479 B.C.... and taught the virtue of Li, which are the
concepts of "propriety, ceremony, ritual, rite, mannerism, etiquette, etc.").
2 Gob, supra note 191, at 39.
240 Such as the United States legal system.
241 Goh, supra note 191, at 39 -40.
242 See

id.; see also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 236, at 42.
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which each can make unlimited demands on the other."2 43 Most
business and professional relationships generally tend to begin and
develop by way of Guanxi connections. 244 "What is uniquely Chinese
is the fact the moral sense of obligation is so overwhelming that one
normally has to comply with requests, unless the request itself is
impossible, or outside one's means to perform it."'245 If, for some
particular reason, a refusal of a guanxi-based request occurs, then the
requesting party will lose face. 246 Furthermore, the quality of "good"
guanxi cannot be overemphasized; it will go a long way in Chinese
247
society.
3. Patience,Flexibility,and Compromise
The Chinese are a people based in a society where the idea of
reasonableness is considered a constant of everyday life.24 8 Yet, the
idea of reasonable contract terms (in Chinese society) is not the same
as in most western Common Law systems. 249 Generally speaking,
contract negotiations in China are broadly based, where the Chinese
"seek general principles," rather than detailed rules explicitly built into
to contract. 25 For example:
[t]he Chinese step back from an actual agreement and
begin negotiations by presenting a letter of
understanding that outlines general principles. US
managers are often put off because they want to get to
details. They're not averse to the rhetoric of the
preambles, but they want to build a relationship on
facts. For their part, the Chinese stress friendly
introductions as a way of establishing their
relationship.2 5'

243
244

Gob, supranote 191, at 39-40.
See id.

245 id.

See supra Part IV. 1.A.
See Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 236, at 43.
248 This is called "chian tao li," meaning the reasonable way. See Goh, supra note
246
247

191, at 40. This is a concept that started back during the time of Confucius-it is a
Confucian
precept. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
249
See generally Goh, supra note 191, at 40.
250

See id.

251Id.
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Therefore, the Chinese do not place priority on contractual
specificities, but on "other social precepts such as mutual benefit,
social harmony and long-term objectives as their guiding principles in

observing the spirit of the transaction." 252 This is a concept deeply
imbedded in Chinese societal history and culture by way of the
teachings of great philosophers and writings such as Confucius
(including Neo-Confucian philosophies) 25 3 in the Analects,2M Sun
Tzu's Art of War,255 The Book of Changes (the I Ching),25 6 the Tao-te
258
257
Ching (Book of Taoist Virtue), 7 and the Book of Mencius.

Therefore, the Chinese place a premium on an agreement that enables
"both parties to act flexibly and reasonably and to make compromises
as the situation so requires while at the same time abiding by the
actual objectives of the dealings themselves." 259 In essence, the

252

Id.; see, e.g., ERIC

LEE, COMMERCLAL DIsPUTES SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 1-4

(1995) (explaining the "Confucian virtue of compromise').
253See LI, supra note 24, 229-34 (explaining that the emergence of NeoConfucianism came about by the increasing popularity of Buddhism and Taoism
One of the primary figures promoting Neoduring the T'ang Dynasty).
Confucianism was Chu Hsi (1130-1200), regarded by many to be one of the greatest
Chinese philosophers of all time. Id. at 228. Neo-Confucianism is the Chinese
philosophy, which developed the concept of Yin and Yang. Id. at 232. See infra
note 254 and accompanying text. E.g., see generally PETER HOWARD CORNE,
FOREIGN INvESTMEN-T LN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIvE LEGAL SYSTEM 17-42 (
1997) ( providing informative insight into the Confucian value system and its affect
on social order in China).
254 The Analects (circa 479) was a book of Confucius' sayings compiled by his
disciples shortly after his death. See id.at 71. The basic premise behind this
extremely important Chinese philosophy (Chinese society is built around these
ideals) is man's relationship to man, to relatives, to their gods, ancestors, and the
state (government). See generally id.at 76-77.
255 See generally, e.g., SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 27-30 (Thomas Cleary trans.,
1988) (establishing that the book was based on sayings by a great military leader,
Sun Tzu,during the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) of the Chou dynasty).
26 See Li, supra note 24, at 81. The I Ching deals predominantly with the
supernatural, and was claimed by both Confucians and Taoists as part of their
tradition.
257 See id.at 327. The Book of Taoist Virtue was the primary book of the Taoist
belief system and philosophy, which was founded by Lao-tzu in the sixth century
B.C. See id.at 84-85. This was a philosophy based on the ideas of fate and the idea
of"nothingness"--4hat nothing is what it really seems to be. See id. at 85-86.
2m See id.at 77-78. This book was written by the great Confucian philosopher
Mencius (372-289 B.C.), and it stresses man's inherent good nature.
259
Goh, supranote 191, at 41.
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Chinese way to handle contracts is for a very general contract to be
established, which can then be amended at various times to suit the
parties wishes--this allows the parties greater maneuverability for
26
which contractual terms can be changed according to the situation. 0
While this may seem rather frightening to the foreigner, it is business
as usual to the Chinese.
The foreign investor (i.e., foreigner)2 61 must also learn to be
patient. Patience is truly a virtue in China, not to mention in almost
every other country in Asia. "[T]o do successful business in China
you need large reservoirs .

. .

. [of] patience . . .patience . . . [and]

patience." 262 The Chinese consider patience a valued asset, thus
Chinese negotiators take a very leisurely approach when negotiating
investment contracts and ventures. 263 Furthermore, the Chinese place
strong emphasis on "'poise, reason, and self-control .' 26 4 -impatient
and negative behavior will be heavily frowned on.2 65
B. The Consultation Process-The Culturally Preferred Method Of
Dispute Resolution
Most foreign investors generally consult with lawyers before
and during the process of FDI negotiations. However, it is normal for
the Chinese to not consult with lawyers because this would infer that
they did not trust the parties involved in the negotiations. 266 In fact,
lawyers would normally 267
only be brought in after the FDI contract has
already been negotiated.
Thus, when a problem with the preceding
agreement is found or when a problem arises during the life of the
investment/venture, the Chinese will always prefer to settle the dispute
by amiable consultation. 26 Consultation is the preferred way to solve
260 See
261

id.

"Wei-gorin" in Mandarin Chinese. See generally JOHN DEFRANcIs, BEGINNING

CHINESE (Yale University Press 2nd ed. 1976) (1964).
262

Gob, supranote 191, at 42.

See id.
264 id.
263

265

See generally id.

266

See Graham, supra note 232, at 254.

267

See id.

268

See Zhang Yuqing, Like Bamboo Shoots After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese

Law and New Regulations on Sino-ForeignJoint Ventures, 8 J. INT'L Bus. 59, 97
(1987).
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disputes, "and has been the main method for settling disputes for
thousands of years., 269 Most Chinese FDI regulatory devices stipulate
that if a dispute arises, the parties should try to settle the dispute by
way of consultation. 270
Although China is a member of the
International Center For The Settlement Of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) and has ratified the United Nations Convention On The
Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New
York Convention), it places strong emphasis on resolving disputes
through informal consultation. Furthermore, consultation is the most
natural form of dispute resolution for Chinese enterprises primarily
because of "Chinese culture and attitudes ... [which] favours harmony
and good relationships between people [and enterprises] and ... [due
to the fact that] most Chinese ... would prefer a compromise reached

by themselves to a decision imposed by another." 27' At its core, this
exemplifies the true spirit of the Chinese--control.
Consultation 272 is simply a discussion between the parties to
the dispute, trying to achieve a settlement. 27 3 This is a method of
informal voluntary (and friendly) discussion between the parties.274
While Chinese regulations (and laws) do not directly explain how to
go about the consultation process, 275 generally speaking, both parties
must first agree to "consult each other to determine the rights and
liabilities and to obtain the truth from facts., 276 Because it is an
26 Dernelle, supra note 10, at 357; Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 236, at 43

(inferring that starting with this process will help build good relations with the local
governments and businesses involved).

See generally supra Part IV.1.C and

accompanying text. It must also be noted that studies have suggested that the better
the foreign enterprise communicates with the Chinese government, the easier it is to
maneuver within the Chinese system. See, e.g., Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 236,
at 42.
270 See Dernelle, supra note 10, at 358; see also Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 236,
at 43 (asserting that "the firm in solving various operational problems .... reaffirms
that positive government cooperation can help foreign firms address specific
operational problems that they may face."). Obviously, the longer the foreign
enterprise has operated in China, the smoother things will operate. See generally,
e.g., Sanyal & Guvenli, supra note 236, at 43.
27 WANG, supra note 46, §9.2.2, at 280.
27 "Xieshang" in Chinese; see DEFRANCIS, supra note 261.
73 See ERIC LEE, COMMERCIAL DISPUTES SETTLEMENT IN CHINA 9-10 (1995).
274 See Mo, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in INTRODUCTION TO CIDNESE LAW 368

(Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997).
275sSee id.
276
LEE, supra note 273, at 10.
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informal process, the process can be started at anytime agreed to and
can end once the parties believe that they have either achieved their
aims or that the consultation process is defunct.2 77 It must be noted
that this is not a method of "compromise through concession and
apportionment of liabilities. 278 While consultation is premised on the
idea of fairness and "fully-informed voluntariness," parties can take
279
advantage of each other and/or make certain unfair concessions.
Once an agreement is reached, in order for it to be binding-since this
is an informal process-both parties to the consultation must be happy
with the final result. 280 "A dissatisfied party may renege on the
agreement and resort to other means of settlement such as arbitration
or litigation." 281 Furthermore, while it's a rather ad hoc process and
can be abused by the more powerful (and influential) of the parties,
consultation serves a very good starting point to resolve disputes
between parties (foreign and Chinese) in FDI disputes.
C. The Mediation Process-TheFavoredBack-up To Consultation

While consultation is the preferred method, mediation28 2 is by
far the second most favored way for resolving FDI disputes in
China,283 and is generally considered by many to be part of the same
process as consultation. 284 The reason for this is the historical fact
that, as with consultation, the origins of mediation are "deeply rooted"
277

278

See id. at 10-11.
Id. at 10.

279 See Mo, supranote 274, at 368-69.
280 See id. at 369.
28 1

Id.

282 In China, mediation and conciliation are synonymous with one another. Here, to
avoid confusion, mediation will be used for ease of understanding and reading.
[Mediation/conciliation is] a consensus based dispute resolution
process in which the parties to a dispute meet with a third party
[the mediator] to discuss mutually acceptable options for
resolution of the dispute. The [mediator] has some input into the
resolution of the dispute in the sense that the [mediator]
encourages the parties to consider options for resolution, which are
fair in all circumstances.
WANG, supra note 46, § 9.3.1, at 282.
283 See Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 14; see also
Yuqing, supra note 268, at 97.
284 See generally id.
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in Confucian philosophy which strongly discourages social conflict
due to its possible obstruction with the natural order of life and other
intrinsic disharmonious principles. 285 Even under the rule of Mao
Zedong's long lasting communist regime, mediation was used as a
powerful tool for applying social, political, and economic pressures on
problematic (at least in Mao's eyes) enterprises and individuals. 286 In
fact, the Communist party, under Chairman Mao, used mediation to
consolidate the Communist party's power-base, thereby instituting its
policies as way of social control.2 7 Today mediation is a favored
option for dispute resolution by the Chinese government because it
embodies certain communist tenets such as "communal obligations
and rejects formal judicial mechanisms which [have] traditionally been
characterized
as
pre-revolutionary
institutions
for class
manipulation., 288 Hence, the link between mediation (along with
consultation), Confucian philosophy, and the Communist ideology is
deeply embedded in China's modern business practices and FDI
negotiation structure.2 8 9

Mediation is considered by most Chinese officials to be the
"'first line of defense' against the deterioration of 'disputes between
friends ' ,'290 which could end-up being, in the end, a dispute between
enemies, as often occurs in other forms of dispute resolution, i.e.
29
litigation. It is viewed as a "pre-arbitration or pre-litigation" 1
process. Therefore, when the consultation process has proven
unsuccessful or inappropriate for the particular FDI dispute at hand,
either party involved may request for mediation. 292 Considering the
alternatives, especially the potentially hazardous and opaque process
25

8

See Parts IV.A-C; see also LEE, supra note 273, at 11.

286 See Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan, Mediation and Conciliation, in
INTERNATIONAL BusINEss AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 86

(Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., 1996); see also supra PartHI.
237 See LEE, supra note 273, at 11 (stating that "[i]n February 1954, with the
promulgation of the Provisional General Rules Concerning the Organization of the

People's [Mediation] Committees, hundreds of People's Committees were set up
throughout the country."). These rules "consolidated the work of the people with

regard to conciliation and placed the conciliation machinery on a proper footing."
Id. at 11-12.
U

id.

289 See id.
m Id. See generally,e.g., Folsom & Minan, supra note 286, at 86-113.
291See LEE, supra note 273, at 12.
292 See Dernelle, supranote 10, at 358.
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of litigation,2 93 mediation is the safest method for a foreign investor to
protect their interest in expensive and rather valuable FDI
projects/ventures. Furthermore, mediation is the safest and most cost

effective way to manage a dispute in a country where "lawyers are
scarce ... discovery procedures are limited ... courts do not possess
injunctive or contempt powers.., there is little [] liability insurance..
. judges are undertrained... [and] there is a tradition of [Communist]

party review of judicial decisions."

294

The actual mediation process is quite informal---procedural
295

issues will not arise within the context of the mediation process.

Essentially each process is molded to fit the particular dispute at
hand. 296

China.297

Numerous commercial dispute laws have been passed in

However, the most important legal mechanisms for

commercial (FDI) mediation in China are the Arbitration Law of the

People's Republic of China (China Arbitration Law), 298 the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)
0
30
rules, 299 and the Rules of the Beijing Conciliation Centre.
"[Mediation] has [also] been accepted as a means of dispute settlement

293

See Folsom & Minan, supra note 286, at 86-87; infra Part IV.5.

294 Folsom & Minan, supra note 286 at 86.
295 See LEE, supra note 273, at 12.
296 See WANG, supra note 46, § 9.3.1, at 282

297 See generally, e.g., Mo, supra note 274, at 370-81 (detailing all of the various
forms of mediation/conciliation in China).
298 See WANG, supra note 46, at 284 n. 18 (describing that the China Arbitration Law
"was passed by the Standing Committee of the NPC on 31 August 1994 and became
effective on 1 September 1995. Articles 51 and 52 [] deal with [mediation].").
299 See Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial
Arbitration at Emory University School of Law (Jan. 24, 2002). CIETAC is a very
popular Chinese arbitration tribunal working under a formalized set of international
arbitration rules, however, the tribunal does regularly assist "disputing parties" in
mediation
proceedings. See id.
3
°°See generally WANG supra note 46, at 286-89.
The Beijing Mediation Centre was setup in 1987 under the China
Chamber of Commerce. It deals with international commercial
mediation and maritime mediation. The Centre's headquarters are
situated in Beijing. It presently has about 25 local branches
throughout the country and about 250 listed mediators. The centre
was set up in response to demands for international commercial
mediation.., from the China Chamber of Commerce.
Mo, supra note 274, at 380.
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in Article 128 of the 301
Contract Law [and]... Article 14 of the Equity
Joint Ventures Law."
There are a few basic tenets that should be followed in order
for mediation to actually take place. For example, under CIETAC,
certain guidelines exist, such as: 1) there must be rules that both
parties are willing to accept; 302 the mediation must be "conducted by
CIETAC to ascertain the facts and distinguish right from wrong on
questions under dispute," 30 3 thereby leading both parties to a form of

compromise; 304 the parties may decide on the choice of law
provisions, which will be completely recognized and enforceable;30 5
international practices can be used and are generally honored; 30 6 and
if an agreement cannot be reached or mediation cannot be continued,
mediation will be terminated and "an examination and oral hearings"
can take place in accordance to arbitration rules and standards.30 7
Under CIETAC rules, there are several ways mediation can be
carried-out prior to moving towards arbitration, including face-to-face
discussions, discussions over the telephone, discussions by mail
(including e-mail). 30 8 Also, the parties can request that two members
of an informal CIETAC mediation panel talk with each side
separately, thus being a conduit for compromise; 30 9 or having a sole
mediator "passing compromise schemes or conveying opinions to the
other party.
Furthermore, while CIETAC is by far the most
popular forum for mediation, there are other options, such as
administrative mediation
by local/city governments, 3 1 1
312

or

court

conducted mediation.

3o See WANG, supra note 46, at 284.
o See id. at 285 (stating that the basic mediation tenets were established by
CIETAC arbitrator Yanming Huang).
V id.
304 See id.
3*

See id.

06 See
30id.

id.

3

id. at 286.
id.

mSee

3M See
310
311

id.
See Mo, supra note 274, at 374-75 (stating that these "organizations have a

general power and obligation to resolve 'small' disputes falling within their
in order to strengthen social stability.").
jurisdiction
312
See id. at 377-79 (explaining that Chinese courts may initiate a mediation session
in most economic/business cases at any point of the litigation process, if they so
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D. Arbitration

Arbitration is naturally the next step in the process, if the
parties are unable to settle their dispute(s) by way of negotiation or
mediation.313 Over the last decade or two, even though the Chinese
prefer negotiation or mediation, arbitration has become a mainstream
form of dispute resolution in China, and the primary way to resolve
international commercial disputes. 314 In fact, "[b]etween 1992 and
1997, the CIETAC accepted 3292 international economic and trade
cases and resolved 2793 of them." 315 This is primarily due to the fact
that foreign multinationals establishing investment projects in China
find this process most attractive because of the "control" and
autonomy over the process. 3 16 Many international investors view this

desire). See generally LEE, supra note 273, at 13-14 (explaining that this form of
mediation dates back to "the Chinese Resistance against the Japanese Invasion
before the People's Republic of China was established. A judge, Ma Xi-wu, first
combined court proceedings with [mediation] in ...[l]iberated [a]reas.").
313 See LEE, supra note 273, at 15. See generally Frederick Brown
& Catherine A.
Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving TransnationalDisputes: A Survey of
Trends in the People's Republic of China, 15 BERKELEY. J. INT'L. L. 329, 330

(1997) (providing a very thorough discussion on the arbitration process in China).
314 See generally Graham, supra note 232, at 254-55.
Arbitration eventuated, in part, from the Confucian ideal of social
harmony and conciliation. Historically, such self-regulation kept
most 'private law' disputes out of the state courts, depending
instead on local conciliation [or arbitration] and the threat of local
censure. [Today,] [a]rbitration and other forms of dispute
resolution represent the mainstream in China .... Furthermore,

arbitration can serve the dual purposes of providing a 'face-saving'
approach to dispute resolution while preserving the underlying
business relationship benefiting both sides. [Thus,] the increasing
prevalence of long-term contractual relationships in international
business [and investment] underscores the importance of
conciliatory dispute resolution mechanisms.
Id.

supra note 46, § 9.4.2, at 293.
See Brown & Rogers, supra note 313, at 330 (stating that "[t]he key paradox is
that, while arbitration in China is imperfect, it remains the best alternative for
international investors."). See generally Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in
International Commercial Arbitration at Emory University School of Law (Jan. 8,
2002) (discussing that, while the fate of the case does lie with a third party, the
proceedings must follow what is provided in the arbitration clause, in the FDI
contract).
315 WANG,
316
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as a way to get around China's very problematic court system. 317
Nonetheless, technically speaking, arbitration is a contractually
stipulated-with an arbitration clause as part of the FDI
contract--agreement to submit any dispute to an impartial tribunal
chosen by the parties. 31 8 Inherent in , international commercial
arbitration, with regard to Chinese FDI disputes, are very appealing
qualities such as procedural fairness, party autonomy in being able to
choose the rules to be followed by the arbitration tribunal, neutrality,
efficiency and cost effectiveness, 19arbitrator competence, and binding
3
awards for the parties to enforce.
317

See generally infra Part V.
318 See Brown & Rogers, supra note 313, at 330; see also Zhang Yuqing, Like
Bamboo Shoots After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on
Sino-foreign Joint Ventures, 8 J. INTL. L. Bus. 59, 97 (1987). See generally
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §11.1. (Tibor Varady, et al eds., 1999)
(noting that an arbitration tribunal from practically any country-due to party
autonomy-can be chosen by mutual agreement of the parties).
319 See INTERNATIONAL COMMiERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 318, at §§ II-V;
John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr , Chinese Commercial Dispute
Resolution Methods: The State Commercial and IndustrialAdministration Bureau,
in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

129 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International Ltd
1996); John A. Spanogle, Jr. & Tibor M. Baranski, Jr, Chinese CommercialDispute
Resolution Methods: The State Commercial and IndustrialAdministration Bureau,
in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

129 (Ralph H. Folsom & W. Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International Ltd
1996); see also Professor Tibor Varady, Class Lecture in International Commercial
Arbitration at Emory University School of Law (Jan. 8, 2002; Jan. 18, 2002; Feb. 19,
2002). But:
Investment contracts often stipulate arbitration in Stockholm
because the forum there is considered neutral. Most Chinese
contracts stipulate arbitration by [CIETAC]. During the past year,
several western participants and panel members in CIETAC
proceedings raised concerns about the organizations procedures
and effectiveness. In one instance, a highly respected American
member of an arbitration panel threatened to resign from CIETAC
over alleged procedural irregularities during consideration [of] a
case ..... enforcement of arbitral awards is sporadic. Sometimes,
even when a foreign company wins in arbitration, the People's
ntermediate Court in the locality where the foreign venture is
situated may fail to enforce the decision. Even when the courts do
attempt to enforce a decision, local officials often ignore court
decisions with impunity.
ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes,May 2001, supranote 14.
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The main international commercial arbitration commission in
China is CIETAC.3 2 ° In fact, CIETAC is the "sole organization in the
PRC authorized to hear non-maritime commercial arbitration cases
between Chinese and foreign parties.",32 1 It must be noted that the
China Chamber of Commerce originally developed CIETAC's
arbitration rules. 322 CIETAC is an official Chinese administrative

body able to exercise it's "delegated legislative power under the
Chinese Constitution and the relevant regulations of the State
Council., 323 While not going into the complexities of how the
arbitration 4process works (this is virtually a universal and uniform
CIETAC does have jurisdiction to cover international or
practice),
foreign trade related disputes, including those related to the Hong
Kong SAR, Macao or Taiwan regions; 325 disputes arising "between
enterprises with foreign investment and disputes between an enterprise
with foreign investment and another Chinese legal person . . . or

economic organisation; 1' 326 disputes arising, for example, from project

320

See WANG, supra note 46, §9.4.4, at 297.

The CIETAC was established in Beijing .... It also has two
regional offices, one established in Sheenn... and the other in
Shanghai ....the CIETAC has 418 arbitrators on its name list for
international economic and trade arbitration. Among these
arbitrators, 25 are citizens of Hong Kong SAR and 112 are
foreigners, of whom eight are Australians.
Id. For a good and very short expose on CIETAC, see Paul R. Weber, China
InternationalEconomic and Trade Arbitration Commission, in CHINA AND HONG
KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION: COMMERCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 73-75

(Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., American Bar Association 2000).
321 Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie, International Commercial Arbitration in China:
History, New Developments, and Current Practice, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 389 (Ralph H. Folsom & W.
Davis Folsom eds., Kluwer Law International 1996).
322 See Mo, supra note 274, at 384.
323 Id.

324 E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1 (Tibor Varady et al. eds.,

West Group 1999); Guo & Tao, supra note 162, at 327. See generally Jerome Alan
Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Co-operation with China, in FOREIGN
TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 508-531

(Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press
Tao, supra note 162, at 327.
325 See Mo, supra note 274, at 383.
326 See

Id.

2 nd

ed. 1987) (1984); See Guo &
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financing; 327 or certain special cases stipulated in the administrative
regulations of the PRC.32
"China ratified the New York Convention in 1986. ' 3 29 It did
make a few reservations to the Convention, which included that China
would only enforce the Convention on the basis of mutual recognition
(thereby refusing to enforce an award in a non-New York Convention
country), and that the Convention would only apply to disputes
recognized under Chinese law. 330 Also, an interesting CIETAC
arbitration feature is that an award must be rendered within nine
months from the date when the arbitration tribunal is formed 3
However, if the parties to the dispute want a quicker and more
efficient process to take place, they would simply need to agree in
writing and apply for the case to be conducted under the Summary
Procedure of CIETAC.332 This means that an award would be
rendered within 30 days if heard orally, or within 90 days of the
formation of the arbitration tribunal if the case is examined "on the
basis of documents only. 3 33 Finally, and most importantly, there is
only institutional arbitration-no ad hoc334arbitration---pertaining to
commercial (investment) matters in China.
E. Litigation-VenturingInto The Undesired World Of Last Resort

As previously mentioned, the Chinese have a very bad
impression of the court process and prefer more amicable ways of
settling disputes, primarily due to being non-confrontational in nature
and not wanting to risk loosing face. 335 However, over the past few
327 See id.
3

28See id.
at 392. The New York Convention of 1958 was named after the place where
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
329 Id.

Arbitral Awards was held. See, e.g., DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (Tibor Varady et al. eds., West Group 1999).
330 Mo, supra note 274, at 392; see supra Part IV.3.
331 See WANG, supra note 46, § 9.4.4.4, at 299.
332 id.
333 id.
3' However,

"'CIETAC does not object to ad hoc arbitration." Id. at § 9.4.4.5, at
300. In fact, "[i]n cooperation agreements signed between CIETAC and arbitral
institutions of other countries, there are provisions allowing parties to select
UNCITRAL ArbitrationRules and form an ad hoc arbitration tribunal." Id.
335
See LEE, supra note 273, at 9.
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decades the Chinese government has established economic court
divisions within the legal framework to handle civil litigation
regarding economic and commercial disputes for the purposes of
curtailing "speculation, profiteering, and all kinds of criminal
activities." 336 But,

[1]itigation of a dispute is possible, but is usually a last
resort. To litigate a dispute involving a foreign
economic contract in the Chinese court system, the
foreign economic contract must not include an
arbitration clause and a written agreement to arbitrate
must not later be reached. In practice, few foreigners or
have litigated their contractual
foreign 33countries
7
disputes.

Hence, the rule of law is still developing in China. 338 In
realizing this, the court system is still predominantly state controlled
and opaque in character, many Chinese court justices and attorney's
have relatively inadequate legal training-compared to western
standards, 339 and biases against foreigners in the Chinese court system
is commonplace. 340 Plus, other problematic factors include rapidly
changing and volatile laws, Mandarin Chinese (the official Chinese
language) is required in all court proceedings, and the fact that foreign
parties can only be represented by Chinese counsel could cause

116

Id. at 18.

337 Demelle, supra note 10, at 358-59; see also Zhang Yuqing, Like Bamboo Shoots

After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on Sino-foreign Joint
Ventures, 8 J. INTL. L. Bus. 59, 97 (1987). See generally Guo & Tao, supra note
162, at 328-29.
338 Brown & Rogers, supra note 313, at 333; see also Stanley B. Lubman,
SinoAmerican Relations and China'sStruggle for the Rule of Law, in CHINA AND HONG
KONG IN LEGAL TRANSITION:

COMMERCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN

ISSUES 9-60

(Joseph W. Dellapenna & Patrick M. Norton eds., American Bar Association 2000)
(detailing the significant legal reforms presently underway in the Chinese legal

s 9stem).

See generally Ralph H. Folsom & John H.Minan, LAW IN The PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 169-241 (Ralph H. Folsom & John H. Minan eds., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1989).
340 See Brown & Rogers, supra note 318, at 333. See generally, Zheng Zhaohuang,
On the Adjudicatory Jurisdiction of Chinese Courts over Foreign Investment
Disputes, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT,

AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA 532-531 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press 2nd ed.
1984) (1987).
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considerable hardship and uncertainty in the litigation process for a
foreign enterprise. 341 Furthermore, it would behoove a foreign
enterprise doing business in China to most definitely have a good
arbitration clause built into their investment or joint-venture contract,
or otherwise find an alternative means for resolving a dispute in a
neutral34 2international forum, rather than contending with a Chinese
court.

V. CONCLUSION
China's investment climate has changed dramatically over the
past few decades. 343 With the advent of the "open door policy," and
most recent accession into the WTO, China has changed its image
344
from one of a hermit kingdom to the last great commercial frontier.
During this same period the Chinese government has established a
number of laws and regulations concerning foreign direct investment
It has also agreed to and
and international commercial activities.
346
While still perceived as
ratified several international agreements.
having a relatively opaque, inefficient and weak legal system, it is in a
period of rapid development and change. 347 This present transition
period may seem quite precarious to the foreign investor, but it is
necessary and inescapable. However, most importantly, China is
pressing on with much needed economic and legal reforms
establishing a more positive investment climate for foreign investment
enterprises operating within its borders. 3 " China's recent entry into
the WTO has only accelerated this process of dramatic transformation.

341 See WkNG, supra note 46, § 1.2.9.12, at 35-36; § 1.2.13.2, at 45; § 9.5, at 306-08.
342 See Brown & Rogers, supra note 313, at 333-34, see also Graham, supra note
232, at 254-55. See generally supra Part I.
343

14

See supra Parts , I1.

See id.

3' 6 See supra Parts M1,IV.
4 See supra Parts 1,111, IV.
341 See supra Part I.
3

s See supra Parts Il

IV.

